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Abstract
We develop a result on Bayesian updating, dubbed information validates the prior (IVP).
Roughly, when two agents have different priors, each believes that a (Blackwell) more
informative experiment will, on average, bring the other’s posterior mean closer to his
own prior mean. We apply the result in two contexts of games of asymmetric information:
voluntary testing or certification, and costly signaling or falsification. IVP can be used
to determine how an agent’s behavior responds to additional exogenous or endogenous
information. We discuss economic implications.
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1. Introduction
Bayesian agents revise their beliefs upon receiving new information. From an ex-ante point of
view, however, one cannot expect new information to systematically alter one’s beliefs in any
particular direction. More precisely, a fundamental property of Bayesian updating is that be-
liefs are a martingale: an agent’s expectation of his posterior belief is equal to his prior belief.
But what about an agent’s expectation of another agent’s posterior belief when their current
beliefs are different? Or, relatedly, should agents expect new information to systematically
affect their disagreement, and if so, how? These questions are not only of intrinsic interest,
but tackling them proves useful for the economics of asymmetric information.
This paper makes three contributions. First, we provide a result concerning the mutual
expectations of Bayesian agents whose beliefs disagree. Second, we show that this result can
be fruitfully applied to familiar common-prior environments with asymmetric information.
Third, we offer some substantive insights into two areas of information economics.
Information validates the prior. In Section 2, we develop our result on Bayesian updating,
which can be loosely described as follows. Let Ω ⊂ R be possible states. Bayesians Anne
(A) and Bob (B) have mutually-known but different priors over Ω, with means mA and mB
respectively. A signal, s, will be drawn from a known information structure or experiment, E .
Let msB denote Bob’s posterior mean after observing signal s. Let E
E
A[m
s
B] be Anne’s ex-ante
expectation of Bob’s posterior mean under experiment E , where the expectation is taken over
signals from Anne’s point of view.
Consider two experiments E and E˜ that are comparable in the sense of Blackwell (1951,
1953); specifically, let E be more informative than E˜ . Theorem 1 establishes that under certain
familiar ordering requirements,1
mA ≤ (≥)mB =⇒ E
E
A [m
s
B] ≤ (≥)E
E˜
A
[
ms˜B
]
. (1)
In words: if Anne has a lower (resp., higher) prior mean than Bob, then Anne predicts that
a more informative experiment will, on average, reduce (resp., raise) Bob’s posterior mean
by a larger amount than a less informative experiment. Put differently, Anne expects more
information to further validate her prior in the sense of bringing Bob’s posterior mean closer
to her prior mean. Of course, Bob expects just the reverse. For short, we refer to the result as
information validates the prior, IVP hereafter.
1 The two priorsmust be likelihood-ratio ordered, and each experimentmust satisfy the monotone likelihood-
ratio property. These assumptions are automatically satisfied if the state is binary.
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Our result has an implication about expected disagreement. A particular signal can lead to
larger posterior disagreement than prior disagreement. Nevertheless, IVP implies (Corollary 1)
that when disagreement in beliefs is quantified by the difference in their means, both Anne
and Bob predict that a more informative experiment will, on average, reduce their posterior
disagreement to a greater extent. In particular, no matter the experiment, they expect lower
posterior disagreement than prior disagreement. At the extreme, both predict zero posterior
disagreement under a fully informative experiment—even though they hold very different
expectations about the other’s posterior mean.
Applications. IVP is a statistical result, which we believe is of intrinsic interest. The latter
part of our paper shows why it is also instrumentally useful in studying games with asym-
metric information. After all, even in common-prior environments, private information can
endowAnne, an informed agent, with a different belief about a fundamental than Bob, an un-
informed agent. In equilibrium, Anne can anticipate how her actions will affect Bob’s belief.
Anne’s strategic incentives may depend on how she expects new information to affect Bob’s
belief, for which IVP is a useful tool. The new information can be exogenous or endogenous,
e.g., owing to the strategic behavior of still other agents.
We develop these points in two contexts.
Voluntary testing. Section 3 studies voluntary testing or certification. An agent has some
private information about his true ability or the quality of his product. At a cost, he can
choose to undertake a test, which provides an independent public signal of quality. Gross of
the testing cost, the agent’s payoff is the market’s posterior expectation of his quality.
Proposition 1 establishes that, under familiar informational assumptions, there is a sense
in which the more (Blackwell) informative the test, the less the agent will choose to get tested.
The intuition we elucidate, using IVP, is that because of pooling, the marginal type who takes
the test expects more informative tests to reduce the benefit of getting tested.
Proposition 1 has economic implications. When market information is of concern, there is
a tradeoff to resolve betweenmore informative tests and participation (cf. Harbaugh and Rasmusen,
2018). On the other hand, in settings where there is no efficiency gain from learning—information
only affects surplus division—ex-ante efficiency improves with better tests (ignoring any di-
rect costs), as they reduce the deadweight loss from testing.
Proposition 1 also sheds light on the incentives of a monopolist certifier. If the certifier can
choose what kind of test to offer the agent—either at an exogenously regulated price or pricing
endogenously—profit is maximized by using the least informative test available, because it
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induces the most participation. This point generalizes an observation of Lizzeri (1999).
Costly signaling. Our IVP theorem is also useful in games of asymmetric information even
when the information asymmetry is eliminated in equilibrium by the agent’s own behavior.
Section 4 illustrates in the context of strategic communication with lying costs (Kartik, 2009),
but we explain how the logic also applies to canonical signaling applications like education
signaling (Spence, 1973).
A sender has some information about a binary state, and can falsify or manipulate his
information by incurring costs. A receiver makes inferences about the state based on both
the sender’s report and some other exogenous information. The sender has linear preferences
over the receiver’s belief about the state. What is the effect of better exogenous information
on the sender’s signaling?
Proposition 2 uses IVP to establish that better exogenous information reduces the sender’s
benefit from falsification to appear more favorable. Intuitively, the sender expects any fa-
vorable receiver belief he induces to get neutralized more by better exogenous information.
Costly deviations become less attractive to the sender, which relaxes his incentive constraints.
Consequently, better exogenous information reduces wasteful signaling—every sender type
is better off, even under full separation. We explain how with a bounded signaling space
the set of separating types also grows, which means the receiver obtains (Blackwell) more
information from the sender. We further interpret these results as delivering a strategic com-
plementary when there are multiple—possibly opposed—senders.
Other applications. We believe IVP will also be useful in other contexts too. Indeed, the
logic of IVP underlies and unifies aspects of mechanisms in some existing papers that study
models with heterogeneous priors under specific information structures. In particular, see the
“persuasion motive” that generates bargaining delays in Yildiz (2004), motivational effects of
difference of opinion in Che and Kartik (2009) and Van den Steen (2010, Proposition 5), and
a rationale for deference in Hirsch (2016, Proposition 8); in a non-strategic setting, see why
minorities expect lower levels of bias in Sethi and Yildiz (2012, Proposition 5). We ourselves
have used IVP to study information acquisition prior to disclosure (Kartik, Lee, and Suen,
2017). We touch on some implications of IVP for Bayesian persuasion in the current paper’s
conclusion, Section 5.
3
2. Information Validates the Prior
Throughout, we use the following standard definitions concerning information structures
(Blackwell, 1953). Fix any finite state space Ω ≡ {ω1, . . . , ωL} ⊂ R, with ω1 ≤ . . . ≤ ωL.
We denote a generic element of Ω by either ω or ωl. Fix a measurable space of signals, (S,S),
endowed with a σ-finite reference measure. An experiment is E ≡ {Pω}ω∈Ω, where Pω is a
probability measure over signals in state ω. We only consider experiments for which each
Pω is absolutely continuous with respect to the reference measure, so that a Radon-Nikodym
derivative exists, denoted p(s|ω); this is the probability density or mass function.
An experiment E˜ ≡ {P˜ω}ω∈Ω, whose signal may be denoted s˜ ∈ S for clarity, is a garbling of
experiment E if there is a Markov kernel Q(·|s) such that for each ω ∈ Ω and every set Σ ∈ S,
P˜ω(Σ) =
∫
S
Q(Σ|s) dPω(s).
This definition captures the statistical notion that E˜ does not provide any information beyond
E : state by state, the distribution of signals in E˜ can be generated by taking signals from E
and transforming them through the state-independent kernel Q(·). Indeed, E is also said to
be more informative than E˜ because every expected-utility decision maker prefers E to E˜ .
An experiment is an MLRP-experiment if there is a total order on S, denoted (with asym-
metric relation ≻), such that the monotone likelihood-ratio property (MLRP) holds:
s′ ≻ s and ω′ > ω =⇒ p(s′|ω′)p(s|ω) ≥ p(s′|ω)p(s|ω′).
Let β ∈ ∆Ω denote a belief, with β(ω) the probability ascribed to state ω. We say that a
belief β ′ likelihood-ratio (LR) dominates belief β, written β ′ ≥LR β or β ≤LR β
′ if, for all ω′ > ω,
β ′(ω′)β(ω) ≥ β(ω′)β ′(ω).
A pair of beliefs are likelihood-ratio ordered if one likelihood-ratio dominates the other.
Anne (A) and Bob (B) are Bayesians with full-support priors on Ω, denoted by βA and βB
respectively, with expectations or means mA and mB .
2 Given an experiment E , we denote
their posterior means after signal s by msi (i = A,B), computed by Bayes rule. Let E
E
i [m
s
j ]
2 That is, mi ≡
∑
ω ωβi(ω). We could just as well take mi to be
∑
ω h(ω)βi(ω) for any increasing h : Ω → R.
(By “increasing”, we mean “weakly increasing”; similarly for related terminology throughout this paper, unless
made explicit otherwise.) This amounts to relabeling each state ω as h(ω).
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denote i’s ex-ante expectation of j’s posterior mean.
If the individuals have the same prior, then EEA[m
s
B] = E
E
A[m
s
A] = mA; the first equality is
because their posteriors agree after any signal, and the second equality is by iterated expecta-
tion. For individuals with different priors, the same conclusion holds when E is fully informa-
tive (i.e., every signal reveals the state), because prior differences become irrelevant. On the
other hand, if E is uninformative (i.e., no signal provides any information) then EEA[m
s
B] = mB .
For the intermediate cases between fully informative and uninformative experiments, there is
monotonicity along any chain of Blackwell-comparable experiments, under some conditions:
Theorem 1. Let βA ≤LR βB, and E and E˜ be MLRP-experiments. If E˜ is a garbling of E , then:
mA ≤ E
E
A [m
s
B] ≤ E
E˜
A
[
ms˜B
]
≤ mB; and
mA ≤ E
E˜
B
[
ms˜A
]
≤ EEB [m
s
A] ≤ mB.
Theorem 1 says that under its ordering requirements, each individual i expects the other’s
posterior mean to be closer to i’s prior mean under a more informative experiment.3 In this
sense, i predicts that a more informative experiment will, on average, bring j’s posterior closer
to i’s prior. That is, more information is expected to further validate one’s prior; or even more
succinctly, information validates the prior, or IVP. It bears emphasis that by relabeling states
(cf. fn. 2), information validates the prior not only in the sense of the mean state, but the
expectation of any increasing function of the state, such as the probability of any {ωl, . . . , ωL}.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix A. For an illustration of the result, suppose Bayesian
updating takes the canonical linear form: the posterior mean is a convex combination of the
prior mean and the signal, as is the case for any exponential family of signals with conju-
gate prior (e.g., normal-normal). It then holds that for any signal s ∈ R under experiment E ,
msj = (1− α
E)mj + α
Es for some αE ∈ [0, 1]. Hence,
EEi
[
msj
]
= (1− αE)mj + α
Emi.
The weight αE is larger when experiment E is more informative, which implies Theorem 1’s
conclusions.
The likelihood-ordering requirement on priors in Theorem 1 is essentially tight. If βA LR
βB , then so long as ω1 < . . . < ωL there is an MLRP-experiment E such that mB < EEB[m
s
A].
4
3 The priors’ likelihood-ratio ordering can be viewed as without loss—the states can be relabeled—so long as
the experiments’ MLRP and beliefs’ means are understood with respect to the states’ relabeling.
4 Let l be any index such that
βB(ωl+1)
βB(ωl)
<
βA(ωl+1)
βA(ωl)
. The claim can be verified by taking E to fully reveal every
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Regarding the MLRP requirement on experiments, Appendix B shows that there exist priors
βA <LR βB and a non-MLRP-experiment E such thatmB < EEA[m
s
B]. Note that even with its or-
dering requirements, Theorem 1’s conclusion cannot be strengthened to FOSD comparisons of
the posterior means; after all, an individual’s own posterior distribution is a mean-preserving
spread under a more informative experiment.
Francetich and Kreps (2014) prove that conditional on any event being true, a Bayesian’s
expected posterior on that event (ignorant of the truth) is larger than her prior; see also Good
(1965). It can be shown that for a binary state, that result and our Theorem 1 are equiva-
lent. Note that any priors and experiments satisfy the theorem’s ordering assumptions with
a binary state. More generally though, neither result implies the other.
Theorem 1 has an interesting implication about expected disagreement. Consider measur-
ing disagreement between beliefs by the distance in their means.5 Typically, experiments can
generate signals for which posterior disagreement is larger than prior disagreement.6 But can
individuals expect, ex ante, to disagree more after observing more information?
Corollary 1. Let βA ≤LR βB, and E and E˜ be MLRP-experiments. If E˜ is a garbling of E , then for
either i and j,
EEi
[
|msi −m
s
j |
]
≤ EE˜i
[
|ms˜i −m
s˜
j |
]
.
Corollary 1 says that—subject to the ordering hypotheses—more information reduces ex-
pected disagreement when disagreement is measured by the (absolute) difference in means.
We omit a proof as the corollary is readily seen to be equivalent to Theorem 1 because any
signal from an MLRP-experiment preserves the prior likelihood-ratio ordering of beliefs and
thus also the ordering by their means; moreover, for any experiment E and individual i,
EEi [m
s
i ] = mi.
In the following sections, we apply IVP to study games of asymmetric information in
which agents begin with a common prior.
state except {ωl, ωl+1}, which are pooled together. Note that this point is consistent with the fact that if βA is
dominated by βB in first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD), then mA ≤ EEB [m
s
A] for any MLRP-experiment E .
Likelihood-ratio ordering is needed to guarantee EEB [m
s
A] ≤ mB . Onuchic r© Ray (2019, Proposition 4) make a
related point.
5 The distance between individuals’ expectations is an interesting measure of disagreement, but obviously
coarse and not without limitations. Zanardo (2017) studies disagreement axiomatically; he provides a result in
the spirit of our Corollary 1 for a family of disagreementmeasures that includes the Kullback-Leibler divergence.
6Yet no signal can polarize beliefs in the sense of FOSD (Baliga, Hanany, and Klibanoff, 2013, Theorem 1).
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3. Voluntary Testing and Certification
Model. An agent has unknown ability or product quality q ∈ Q ⊂ R, where Q is a finite set.
There is a full-support prior pi(q), whose expectation is denoted pie. The agent privately re-
ceives information, referred to as his type, t ∈ T ≡ [t, t] ⊂ R from the density f(t|q) satisfying
the strict MLRP. Without loss, we assume E[q|t] = t. The agent then publicly chooses whether
to take a test or not. If he takes the test, a public result or signal s ∈ S is drawn from density
g(s|q)withMLRP; s is conditionally independent of t. After observing whether the agent took
the test, and if so, the test result, a decision maker or market forms belief δ ∈ ∆Q and hires the
agent at a wage (or buys the product at a price) w = δe, the market’s posterior expectation of
quality. Taking the test costs the agent c ≥ 0, and so the agent’s von Neumann-Morgenstern
payoff is w − c if he took the test and w if he did not.
Equilibrium. Since the test is conditionally independent of the agent’s own information, we
can think of the market as updating in two steps: it first forms an “interim belief” about qual-
ity by updating its prior with what the agent’s action reveals about his private information t;
thereafter, if the agent took the test, it updates the interim belief using the test result s. Ac-
cordingly, denote the market’s interim belief when the agent takes the test (before observing
the test result) as δ+ and when the agent does not as δ−. The agent’s private belief is denoted
β(t). Plainly, the agent of type twill take the test if and only if (modulo indifference)
Es|t[δ
e(s; δ+)]− c > δ
e
−,
where δe(s; δ+) is the market posterior expectation upon observing test result s given interim
belief δ+, and δ
e
− is the no-test expected quality. The left-hand side of the above inequality is
strictly increasing in t: for any tH > tL,
Es|tH [δ(s; δ+)]− Es|tL[δ(s; δ+)] =
∑
q
[β(q|tH)− β(q|tL)]Es|q[δ
e(s; δ+)]
is strictly positive because Es|q[δe(s; δ+)] is increasing in q by the test’s MLRP, and β(·|tH)
strictly first-order stochastically dominates β(·|tL) by strict MLRP of the agent’s private in-
formation.7
Therefore, all (weak Perfect Bayesian) equilibria are described by a cutoff t∗ ∈ T such that
7 To be precise, we are ignoring the case where Es|q[δe(s; δ+)] is constant in q. Accounting for this possibility
would not materially affect what follows. The possibility is ruled out when g(s|q) has the strict MLRP and δ+ is
non-degenerate.
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the agent takes the test if t > t∗ and does not if t < t∗. Let δ−(t
∗) and δ+(t
∗) denote the interim
beliefs computed from Bayes rule given any interior cutoff t∗. Consistent with the expected
gain from testing strictly increasing in type, we restrict attention to equilibria in which if no
type gets tested (t∗ = t), then the off-path interim belief upon testing is δ+(t) ≡ β(t); similarly,
if all types get tested (t∗ = t), then the no-test off-path belief must be δ−(t) ≡ β(t). Since
intervals of signals preserve MLRP structure (Milgrom, 1981, Theorem 4), it holds that for
any t∗ ∈ T , δ−(t
∗) and δ+(t
∗) are likelihood-ratio ordered with all β(t).
Lemma 1. A cutoff t∗ is an equilibrium cutoff if and only if:
1. t∗ is interior and
Es|t∗ [δ
e(s; δ+(t
∗))] = E[t|t < t∗]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=δe
−
(t∗)
+c; (2)
2. t∗ = t and Es|t[δe(s; pi)] ≥ t+ c; or
3. t∗ = t and t ≤ pie + c.
We omit the routine proof. The characterization implies that an equilibrium exists. There
may be multiple equilibria. A critical observation is that at any interior equilibrium cutoff t∗,
δe−(t
∗) = E[t|t < t∗] < t∗ ≤ Es|t∗ [δ
e(s; δ+(t
∗))] ≤ δe+(t
∗) = E[t|t > t∗],
with at least one of the weak inequalities being strict. The two inequalities follow from IVP,
as Theorem 1’s ordering hypotheses are satisfied. Intuitively, as the cutoff type is pooled with
all higher types, it expects the test to cause a downward revision from the market’s interim
quality expectation. The cutoff type is nevertheless willing to take the test because not taking
it would lead to an even worse expectation, δe−(t
∗). It follows that t∗ − δe−(t
∗) ≤ c; there is
equality only with a fully informative test. With such a test, the setting is effectively one of
costly voluntary disclosure (Jovanovic, 1982; Verrecchia, 1983). If the test is uninformative,
then δe+(t
∗)− δe−(t
∗) = c; it is as if the agent can simply take a pure money-burning action.
Comparative statics. What happens when the test becomes (Blackwell) more informative?
Intuitively, IVP assures that the cutoff type expects the “disagreement” between its private
belief and the market’s interim belief δ+ to shrink by more. The cutoff type’s expected benefit
of taking the test is thus lower. On the other hand, the payoff from not taking the test, δe−, is
unaffected. Consequently, fewer types should take the test. Formally:
Proposition 1. If the test becomes more informative, then the smallest and largest equilibrium cutoffs
increase.
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Proof. Consider two test distributions, g and g, with the latter more informative. Define
L(t; g) ≡ Eg
s|t[δ
e(s; δ+(t))] andR(t) ≡ δ
e
−(t)−c; these correspond to the two sides of Equation 2.
IVP (Theorem 1) implies that L(t; g) ≥ L(t; g) for all t. We argue below that the largest equi-
librium cutoff increases; an analogous argument applies to the smallest.
The conclusion is trivial if t ≤ pie + c, as Lemma 1 implies the largest equilibrium cutoff
is t regardless of the test. So suppose t > pie + c, or equivalently, L(t; g) > R(t) for any g. If
L(t; g) > R(t) for all t > t, the only equilibrium cutoff under g is t, and the conclusion follows.
So suppose L(t; g) = R(t) for some interior t. Continuity and L(·; g) ≥ L(·; g) imply that the
largest intersection of L(·; g) and R(·; g) is at least as large as that of L(·; g) and R(·; g).
Extremal equilibria are stable in the sense of best-response dynamics; specifically, if their
cutoffs are interior, the left-hand side of Equation 2 crosses the right-hand side from below.
Proposition 1’s comparative static extends to other stable equilibria as well, but it can reverse
for unstable equilibria, as is a common theme in games with multiple equilibria.
Ex ante, the agent prefers a larger equilibrium cutoff because his ex-ante expected wage
is pie regardless of the equilibrium, and a larger cutoff reduces the likelihood of having to
take the test. Therefore, focussing on the largest equilibrium is justified on ex-ante utilitarian
grounds if the agent’s wage is purely redistributive and learning about quality has no effi-
ciency benefit. Indeed, Proposition 1 implies that from this perspective less informative tests
and their largest equilibrium cutoffs are socially preferable.
Proposition 1’s lesson that more informative tests reduce testing participation echoes and
broadens a point made by Harbaugh and Rasmusen (2018) that fully informative tests do no
maximize participation. Unlike them, we do not require the agent to be perfectly informed
about quality, and we compare any pair of Blackwell-ranked tests. Their focus was on solving
for the optimal test to minimize the market’s mean squared error.
Certification by an intermediary. View the agent’s cost c as the price charged by a monop-
olist testing firm or certifying intermediary who must offer a single test. Momentarily take
c as given. Then the monopolist seeks to simply maximize the fraction of agents who take
the test, i.e., to minimize the equilibrium cutoff. It follows from Proposition 1 that (focussing
on an extremal equilibrium) the monopolist will choose the least informative test available,
if such a test exists—even if all available tests are costless to perform, and a fortiori, if more
informative tests are more costly. In particular, if the uninformative test is available (and least
costly), the monopolist will choose that. Consequently, when the monopolist can choose any
test and any price c, and we select the profit-maximizing equilibrium cutoff, it is optimal to
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choose an uninformative test and price c = pie − t. At this price, all types get tested and the
monopolist makes the maximum possible profit subject to the agent’s minimum payoff of t.8
This discussion generalizes themes from Lizzeri (1999), who assumed a perfectly-informed
agent, endogenous pricing, and availability of all tests. Our analysis clarifies that the eco-
nomic force favoring less informative tests does not turn on any of the conditions—rather,
even with a partially-informed agent, demand (in a profit-maximizing equilibrium) at any
price is higher when the monopolist chooses a less informative test.
4. Costly Signaling and Falsification
Our second application shows how IVP is useful in games with asymmetric information even
when there may be no “disagreement” in equilibrium because of (full) separation; rather,
what is crucial is how information affects disagreement off the equilibrium path.
4.1. Model
We consider a communication gamewith lying costs or costly falsification, following Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani
(2007) and Kartik (2009), but adding exogenous information. A sender and a receiver share a
common non-degenerate prior about a state ω ∈ {0, 1}. The sender privately learns his type
t ∈ [0, 1], normalized to equal his private belief that ω = 1, drawn from a density f(t|ω). The
sender sends a report r ≥ 0 that entails a cost c(r, t), elaborated below. The receiver forms a
belief based on both r and an additional signal s ∈ R that, conditional on the state ω, is drawn
independently of t or r from a density g(s|ω) > 0. Without loss, we assume g(·) satisfies the
MLRP. The signal s can either be the receiver’s private information or publicly observed af-
ter the sender has acted. Denote the receiver’s posterior expectation of the state by E[ω|r, s].
The sender’s von Neumann-Morgenstern payoff is linear in this expectation; specifically, his
payoff is
E[ω|r, s]− c(r, t).
The receiver’s belief updating can be analyzed in two steps: based on the sender’s report
r, she forms an interim belief pi(r) ∈ [0, 1] about the state (all beliefs about the state refer to
the probability of ω = 1) and then uses this interim belief to further update from the signal s
to form a posterior belief about the state β(s; pi(r)). By Bayes rule,
β(s; pi) =
pig(s|1)
pig(s|1) + (1− pi)g(s|0)
. (3)
8 If the type distribution under the prior has a strictly decreasing density, then δe+(t)− δ
e
−(t) is strictly increas-
ing in t and hence t is the unique cutoff equilibrium when the test is uninformative and c = pie − t.
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The expected payoff of a type-t sender from report r is thus
Es|t[β(s; pi(r))]− c(r, t),
where Es|t denotes t’s expectation over the signal s. The first term in the above display is
strictly increasing in pi(r): the sender prefers inducing a higher interim belief, as that raises
the receiver’s posterior after any signal.
Assume the cost function c(r, t) is smooth with ∂c(t, t)/∂r = 0 for all t, i.e., the marginal
cost of lying when telling the truth is zero. Furthermore, the marginal cost of sending a
higher report is increasing in the report and decreasing in the type, i.e., ∂2c(r, t)/∂r2 > 0 >
∂2c(r, t)/∂r∂t for all t, r.
A single-crossing condition. Due to the receiver’s exogenous information, the above cost
assumptions do not guarantee a suitable single-crossing property of the sender’s indifference
curves. The indifference curves of interest are those in the space of the sender’s report r
and the receiver’s interim belief pi. For any type t, these indifference curves slope upwards
for r > t: costly lying requires a higher interim-belief compensation. The single-crossing
property we require is that—no matter the exogenous information’s distribution—these in-
difference curves are flatter for higher types, meaning that higher types are more willing to
inflate their report to induce a higher interim belief. Lemma A.1 in Appendix A establishes
that this property is assured by the following assumption that we will maintain:
For t < 1 and t < r:
∂2c(r, t)/∂r∂t
∂c(r, t)/∂r
≤ −
1
1 − t
. (4)
Condition (4) can be interpreted as saying that higher types have a sufficiently large
marginal cost advantage relative to marginal cost. An example of a cost function that sat-
isfies all our requirements is c(r, t) = (r − t)2.
Another interpretation. Although our model is posed as a communication game, it can also
be viewed as adding exogenous information to a variation of the standard Spence (1973) sig-
naling model. In this interpretation, a worker possesses a private trait, his type t (e.g., intel-
ligence), which is indicative of whether his job productivity will be high or low. A potential
employer also observes a signal s about that productivity (e.g., through an interview process).
The worker’s wage depends on the employer’s posterior on productivity, given the worker’s
schooling level r and the employer’s signal s. The marginal cost of schooling decreases in
the characteristic t (∂2c(r, t)/∂r∂t < 0). While we assume that higher-type workers intrinsi-
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cally prefer acquiring more education (∂c(t, t)/∂r = 0), our analysis also applies if all workers
prefer less education (∂c(r, t)/∂r > 0); see Subsection 4.4.
4.2. Equilibrium
We focus on the least-cost (fully) separating equilibrium, or LCSE, as is standard. In such an
equilibrium the sender’s pure strategy ρ : [0, 1] → R+ is strictly increasing, with the “Riley
condition” ρ(0) = 0. For r ∈ [0, ρ(1)], the receiver’s interim belief upon observing r is pi(r) =
ρ−1(r). Without loss, we stipulate that for r > ρ(1), pi(r) = 1. Standard arguments imply that
the LCSE equilibrium strategy ρ(·)must satisfy the differential equation
∂c(ρ(t), t)
∂r
ρ′(t) =
∂Es|t [β(s; t)]
∂pi
. (5)
Equation 5 obtains from the binding local upward incentive compatibility constraints. The
left-hand side is type t’s marginal cost of mimicking a slightly higher type; the right-hand
side is the marginal benefit, which comes from inducing a higher receiver interim belief. This
benefit is affected by the sender’s belief about the exogenous signal s. Since ρ′(t) > 0 and
Equation 5’s right-hand side is strictly positive, any solution has ρ(t) > t for t > 0.
Condition (4), which yields the requisite single-crossing property, guarantees that not only
are Equation 5 and the boundary condition ρ(0) = 0 necessary in an LCSE, but they are also
sufficient (i.e., global incentive compatibility is assured). As standard arguments imply that
this boundary-value problem has a unique solution, we state without proof:
Lemma 2. There is a unique LCSE.
4.3. Comparative statics
How does (Blackwell) more informative exogenous information affect the sender’s LCSE sig-
naling strategy? Crucially, the strategy is determined by the local upward incentive con-
straints. Intuitively, when type tmimicks a slightly higher type t + ε it creates disagreement:
type t views the receiver’s interim belief t + ε as higher than the truth. IVP implies that t
expects a more informative exogenous signal to correct that interim belief by more, and so t’s
gain from inducing that interim belief is lower under a more informative experiment. For-
mally:
Lemma 3. If s˜ is drawn from a more informative experiment than s, then for any t < 1,
∂Es˜|t [β(s˜; t)]
∂pi
≤
∂Es|t [β(s; t)]
∂pi
.
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Proof. IVP (Theorem 1) implies that for any t < 1 and small ε > 0,
Es˜|t [β(s˜; t+ ε)]− Es˜|t [β(s˜; t)] ≤ Es|t [β(s; t+ ε)]− Es|t [β(s; t)] ,
because Es˜|t[β(s˜; t)] = Es|t[β(s; t)] = t. (Theorem 1’s ordering hypotheses hold because both
the sender’s and receiver’s information have the MLRP.) The result follows from dividing
both sides of the above inequality by ε and taking ε→ 0.
Lemma 3 implies that more informative exogenous information reduces the right-hand
side of Equation 5. Since each type expects a smaller marginal benefit from inducing a higher
belief in the receiver, the solution ρ to the differential equation (5) with boundary condition
ρ(0) = 0 is pointwise lower. It is therefore intuitive, and proved in Appendix A, that:
Proposition 2. In the LCSE, every sender type bears a lower signaling cost when the receiver’s exoge-
nous information is more informative.
Consequently, every sender type is better off when the receiver’s information improves,
because in the LCSE every type t expects the receiver’s posterior to be t regardless of the
exogenous information distribution. Plainly, the receiver is also better off (given any von
Neumann-Morgenstern payoff function) with better exogenous information.
4.4. Discussion and implications
A very similar analysis, with the same conclusion as Proposition 2, would apply if we had
instead assumed a` la Spence (1973) that all types would choose r = 0 under complete infor-
mation. Specifically, we could have instead assumed the signaling cost function c(r, t) satisfies
∂c/∂r > 0, ∂2c/∂r2 > 0, and ∂2c/∂r∂t < 0, and required the inequality in (4) to hold for all
t < 1 and r > 0.
One reason we choose the costly lying setup is that the analysis also extends to a bounded
report space, which is natural there. Specifically, suppose the sender’s report must be in [0, 1],
his type space. Then, given our original assumptions on c(·), there cannot be a fully sep-
arating equilibrium; in particular, recall that for a strictly increasing strategy ρ, a solution to
Equation 5 entails ρ(t) > t for all t > 0. In a previous version of this paper (Kartik, Lee, and Suen,
2019), we analyzed a salient equilibrium that extends the LCSE to this case: there is separa-
tion up to some cutoff type t∗ < 1 and pooling on r = 1 thereafter. The sender’s strategy
in the separating region is unchanged: ρ(0) = 0 and Equation 5 holds. The cutoff t∗ is de-
termined by its indifference. More informative exogenous information then not only lowers
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every type’s signaling cost, but also raises the cutoff t∗ (again due to IVP, similar to the logic
that reduces the benefit of pooling in Section 3). The larger region of separation means the
sender’s signaling is more informative.
Since Proposition 2 and the above extension apply to arbitrary receiver information, one
can adapt the analysis to study multi-sender signaling games in which each sender gets a
conditionally independent signal about the state. Suppose some senders are upward biased
and others are downward biased, and each chooses a report in [0, 1].9 This model applies to
competing persuaders with falsification costs in various economic domains: lobbyists, media,
legal parties, etc. From each sender’s perspective, the other senders’ reports are endogenous
experiments. The logic underlying Proposition 2 implies that senders’ strategies are strategic
complements: in equilibria where each sender uses a cutoff strategy as described above, each
sender reveals more and bears a lower signaling cost when other senders reveal more. It
follows that the receiver learns more about the state with more senders; beyond the obvious
direct benefit of adding a sender, there is an indirect benefit of existing senders revealingmore.
Each sender’s ex-ante welfare is also higher, as his equilibrium signaling cost decreases while
the receiver’s average posterior is unaffected. Furthermore, if any sender’s cost increases in a
suitable sense (for example, if sender i’s cost is kic(r, t) and ki > 0 increases), which can also be
interpreted as lowering his persuasion incentive, then not only does that sender reveal more,
but so do all other senders.
Although it may seem unsurprising that better receiver information reduces a sender’s
gain from misrepresentation, and therefore reduces the sender’s incentive to incur falsifica-
tion costs, we emphasize that Proposition 2 relies on IVP. Supplementary Appendix C shows
that if the sender’s payoff is not linear in the receiver’s posterior, or if the receiver’s infor-
mation violates MLRP (in a multi-state extension of the model), then better exogenous infor-
mation can increase the sender’s marginal benefit from mimicking a higher type, leading to
higher equilibrium signaling costs.
Frank (1985, Section III) also suggests that better exogenous information can reduce dis-
sipative signaling. Weiss (1983) studies when exogenous information allows for separating
equilibria even absent any heterogeneity in the direct costs of signaling; his focus is not on
comparative statics. Daley and Green (2014) emphasize the stability of non-separating equi-
libria when the marginal cost advantage of higher types is small relative to the accuracy of
9A downward-biased sender’s payoff is −E[ω|r, s] − c(r, t). The relevant strategy for this sender is given
by ρ(1) = 1, the analog of Equation 5 with the right-hand side’s sign flipped, and all types below some cutoff
pooling on report r = 0. For any t ∈ (0, 1), ρ(t) < t, i.e., a downward-biased sender deflates rather than inflates
his report.
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exogenous information; this leads to a “double crossing” of appropriate indifference curves,
contrary to the single crossing assured by our condition (4). Truyts (2015) shows that better
exogenous information can exacerbate dissipative signaling when signaling is noisy.
5. Conclusion
IVP is instructive more broadly than for just the two applications with asymmetric informa-
tion developed in this paper. In an earlier version (Kartik et al., 2019), we used IVP to study
voluntary disclosure with either concealment or disclosure costs.
We close by briefly commenting on a domain with symmetric information. Consider
Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). Alonso and Caˆmara (2016) develop
a general analysis under heterogeneous priors; see also Galperti (2019) and Onuchic r© Ray
(2019). When the sender’s preferences are state-independent and concave in the receiver’s
posterior expectation, there is no scope for beneficial persuasion under common priors.
Alonso and Caˆmara (2016, Section 4.3) show that this observation does not hold generically
with heterogenous priors and at least three states. Our Theorem 1 delivers additional insights.
For example, if the priors are likelihood-ratio ordered, then among MLRP-experiments the
sender prefers less informative experiments when facing a favorable receiver, i.e., one whose
prior dominates (resp., is dominated by) the sender’s if the sender’s utility is increasing (resp.,
decreasing) in the receiver’s posterior expectation. Consequently, in that scenario, an unin-
formative experiment is optimal if all and only MLRP-experiments are available.10
10Analogous to fn. 4, priors ordered by FOSD are sufficient for optimality of an uninformative experiment
(Onuchic r© Ray, 2019, also make this point restricting attention to a subset of MLRP-experiments), but not for
the broader preference ranking of MLRP-experiments by their informativeness.
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Appendices
A. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove the statement about A’s expectations; B’s are analogous. It
is sufficient to establish EEA [m
s
B] ≤ E
E˜
A
[
ms˜B
]
, as the other two inequalities are implied by the
observation before Theorem 1 aboutA’s expectations under fully informative and uninforma-
tive experiments.
Let p(s|ω) denote the signal density of experiment E and p˜(s˜|ω) that of the garbling E˜ .
For notational simplicity, we proceed assuming there is a non-negative kernel q(s˜|s) with∫
s˜
q(s˜|s) ds˜ = 1 for all s, such that for any state ω,
p˜(s˜|ω) =
∫
s
q(s˜|s)p(s|ω) ds.
For i = A,B, let pi(s) ≡
∑
ω p(s|ω)βi(ω) and p˜i(s˜) ≡
∑
ω p˜(s˜|ω)βi(ω). The conditional density
of any signal s from E given any signal s˜ from E˜ , using prior βi, is
qˆi(s|s˜) =
q(s˜|s)pi(s)
p˜i(s˜)
.
Therefore,
qˆB(s|s˜)
qˆA(s|s˜)
=
p˜A(s˜)
p˜B(s˜)
pB(s)
pA(s)
.
As E satisfies MLRP and βB ≥LR βA, the ratio pB(s)/pA(s) is increasing. Therefore, for any s˜,
qˆA(·|s˜) ≤LR qˆB(·|s˜).
11 (A.1)
As βsB is increasing in s in the sense of FOSD by E ’s MLRP, the meanm
s
B is increasing in s.
Consequently, for any s˜,
EEA [m
s
B | s˜] ≤ E
E
B [m
s
B | s˜] = m
s˜
B, (A.2)
where the inequality follows from (A.1) and the equality is by iterated expectation. Taking
the expectation in (A.2) over s˜ using the prior βA gives
EEA [m
s
B] = E
E˜
A
[
EEA [m
s
B | s˜]
]
≤ EE˜A
[
ms˜B
]
,
where the equality is by the law of iterated expectation.
11A FOSD ranking is sufficient for what follows, but even that is not assured if βB only FOSD-dominates βA.
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Lemma A.1. For t < 1 and t < r,
∂c(r, t)/∂r
∂Es|t[β(s; pi)]/∂pi
strictly decreases in t.
Proof. Differentiating (3) and manipulating, the sender’s marginal rate of substitution be-
tween r and pi is given by
∂c(r, t)/∂r
∂Es|t[β(s; pi)]/∂pi
= pi(1− pi)
∂c(r, t)/∂r
Es|t[β(s; pi)(1− β(s; pi))]
.
Differentiating with respect to t, noting that Es|t[·] = t[·] + (1 − t)[·], and rearranging, we see
that for t < m, the marginal rate of substitution strictly decreases in t if
∂2c(r, t)/∂r∂t
∂c(r, t)/∂r
<
Es|1[β(s; pi)(1− β(s; pi))]− Es|0[β(s; pi)(1− β(s; pi))]
tEs|1[β(s; pi)(1− β(s; pi))] + (1− t)Es|0[β(s; pi)(1− β(s; pi))]
.
Since both Es|1[β(s; pi)(1 − β(s; pi))] and Es|0[β(s; pi)(1− β(s; pi))] are strictly positive, for t < 1
the right-hand side of the above inequality is strictly greater than
0− Es|0[β(s; pi)(1− β(s; pi))]
0 + (1− t)Es|0[β(s; pi)(1− β(s; pi))]
= −
1
1− t
.
So, if (4) holds, the marginal rate of substitution strictly decreases in t for t < 1 and t < r.
Proof of Proposition 2. If we show that ρ(t) decreases pointwise when the right-hand side of
Equation 5 decreases for all t, then the result follows from Lemma 3. Accordingly, let ρ˜(t) and
ρ(t) be two solutions to Equation 5, with ρ˜(0) = ρ(0) = 0, where ρ˜ solves Equation 5 with a
pointwise lower right-hand side. For any t > 0, if ρ˜(t) = ρ(t) then ρ′(t) ≥ ρ˜′(t) > 0. This
implies that at any touching point, ρmust touch ρ˜ from below. Consequently, by continuity,
ρ(t′) ≥ ρ˜(t′) for t′ > 0 =⇒ ρ(t) ≥ ρ˜(t) for all t ≥ t′.
Now suppose, to contradiction, that ρ˜(tˆ) > ρ(tˆ) for some for tˆ > 0. It must hold that ρ˜(t) > ρ(t)
for all t ∈ (0, tˆ). Since ∂2c/∂r2 > 0 and ρ˜ corresponds to a lower right-hand side of Equation 5,
it follows from Equation 5 that ρ˜′(t) < ρ′(t) for all t ∈ (0, tˆ). But then
ρ˜(tˆ)− ρ(tˆ) =
∫ tˆ
0
[ρ˜′(t)− ρ′(t)] dt < 0,
a contradiction.
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B. Discussion of Theorem 1
Example B.1. Let Ω = {0, 1, 2}. Consider the following non-MLRP experiment E with signal
space S = {l, h}: [
Pr(l|0) Pr(l|1) Pr(l|2)
Pr(h|0) Pr(h|1) Pr(h|2)
]
=
[
0 1 0
1 0 1
]
.
Consider priors βA = (0.9, 0.1, 0) <LR βB = (0, 0.2, 0.8). A calculation yieldsmA = 0.1 < mB =
1.8 < EEA[m
s
B] = 1.9, contrary to Theorem 1’s conclusion. ⋄
The priors in Example B.1 violate full support, but the point goes through if βB(0) and
βA(2) are replaced with a small ε > 0. Alonso and Caˆmara (2016, pp. 674–675) use a similar
example to illustrate how a “skeptic” can design information to persuade a “believer.”
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C. Supplementary Appendix (Not for Publication)
Consider the costly signaling application from Section 4. Recall that in a LCSE equilibrium,
the sender’s strategy ρ(·) is determined by the initial condition ρ(0) = 0 and the differential
equation (5):
∂c(ρ(t), t)
∂r
ρ′(t) =
∂Es|t [β(s; t)]
∂pi
.
Lemma 3 established that
∂Es˜|t [β(s˜; t)]
∂pi
≤
∂Es|t [β(s; t)]
∂pi
(C.1)
when signal s˜ is more informative (i.e., drawn from a more informative experiment) than sig-
nal s. Inequality (C.1) implies that the solution to the aforementioned initial-value problem is
pointwise lower under themore informative experiment, and hence the equilibrium signaling
level ρ(t) is lower for every type when the receiver has access to s˜ rather than s.
We show below how the conclusion can be altered by dropping either linearity of the
sender’s payoff in the receiver’s posterior (Example C.1) or the MLRP of the receiver’s exper-
iments (Example C.2).
Example C.1. Letting V (β) ≡ β/(1− β), suppose the sender’s payoff is
V (β)− c(r, t),
which is convex in the receiver’s posterior β. Condition (4) in Section 4 continues to imply the
relevant single-crossing condition for this modified objective. Using Bayes rule, we compute
Es|t[V (β(s; pi))] =
pi
1− pi
Es|t
[
g(s|1)
g(s|0)
]
.
Differentiating and evaluating at pi = t,
∂Es|t[V (β(s; t))]
∂pi
=
1
t(1− t)
Es|t
[
β(s; t)
1− β(s; t)
]
.
The term inside the expectation operator on the right-hand side above is a convex function of
β(·). It follows that
∂Es˜|t[V (β(s˜; t))]
∂pi
≥
∂Es|t[V (β(s; t))]
∂pi
,
by contrast to (C.1). That is, the convexity in V (·) is strong enough to ensure that the marginal
benefit from inducing a higher interim belief pi (locally, at pi = t) is higher when the exogenous
signal is more informative. It follows that in an LCSE equilibrium, all types bear a higher
signaling cost when the exogenous signal is more informative.12 ⋄
12On the other hand, if V (β) ≡ log[β/(1 − β)], then the local marginal benefit of inducing a higher interim
belief is independent of the exogenous experiment. The reason is that V (β(s, pi)) = log
(
pi
1−pi
)
+ log
(
g(s|1)
g(s|0)
)
and
hence ∂Es|t[V (β(s; t))]/∂pi does not depend on g(·). Note that V (·) here is neither convex nor concave.
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Example C.2. To see that MLRP-experiments are important, we have to modify the signaling
model of Section 4 by introducing more states, because any experiment in a two-state model
is an MLRP-experiment.
Assume a full-support common prior about the state ω ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The sender receives
some private information, indexed by t ∈ [0, 1], which updates his belief about the state to
(z, 1 − z(1 + t), zt), where each element of this vector is the probability assigned to the corre-
sponding state. The parameter z ∈ (0, 1/2) is a commonly-known constant. We refer to t as
the sender’s type. Letting M(β) ≡
∑
ω ωβ(ω) be the receiver’s expectation of the state when
she holds belief β, the sender’s payoff is
M(β)− c(r, t).
Let s represent the outcome of an uninformative experiment, and let βs
tˆ
represent the pos-
terior of the receiver after observing s when she puts probability one on the sender’s type tˆ.
It clearly holds that
Es|t
[
M(βs
tˆ
)
]
= M(βs
tˆ
) = 1− z + ztˆ.
The derivative with respect to tˆ, evaluated at tˆ = t, is
∂Es|t [M(βst )]
∂tˆ
= z. (C.2)
Now consider an informative experiment with a binary signal space, s˜ ∈ {l, h}. Let the
probability distributions g(s˜|ω) be given by:[
g(l|0) g(l|1) g(l|2)
g(h|0) g(h|1) g(h|2)
]
=
[
0 1 0
1 0 1
]
.
This experiment is the same as that in Example B.1 of Appendix B; it is not anMLRP-experiment.
Suppose the receiver ascribes probability one to the sender’s type tˆ. By Bayes rule, if the
signal realization is s˜ = l, the receiver’s posterior is βl
tˆ
= (0, 1, 0), with M(βl
tˆ
) = 1. For signal
realization s˜ = h,
βh
tˆ
=
(
1
1 + tˆ
, 0,
tˆ
1 + tˆ
)
, with M(βh
tˆ
) =
2tˆ
1 + tˆ
.
The sender of type t’s expectation is
Es˜|t
[
M(β s˜
tˆ
)
]
= (1− z(1 + t))M(βl
tˆ
) + z(1 + t)M(βh
tˆ
).
The derivative with respect to tˆ, evaluated at tˆ = t, is
∂Es˜|t
[
M(β s˜t )
]
∂tˆ
=
2z
1 + t
. (C.3)
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Combining (C.2) and (C.3),
∂Es˜|t
[
M(β s˜t )
]
∂tˆ
≥
∂Es|t [M(βst )]
∂tˆ
, (C.4)
which is the opposite inequality to (C.1), even though s˜ is drawn a more informative experi-
ment than s.
Both Es|t[M(β(s; tˆ))] and Es˜|t[M(β(s˜; tˆ))] are supermodular in the sender’s type t, in this
example. The assumption that ∂c(r, t)/∂r∂t < 0 ensures that indifference curves in the space
of (r, tˆ) for different types are single crossing. As local incentive compatibility then implies
global incentive compatibility, (C.4) implies that in the LCSE all types incur higher signaling
costs when the receiver has access to the more informative experiment. ⋄
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